Kampagnen der Armee des Potomac [elektronische Ressource] : Eine kritische Geschichte der Operationen in Virginia, Maryland und Pennsylvania, vom Beginn bis zum Ende des Krieges 1861-5. mal Namen; denn er wußte nicht, was er auf der anderen Seite begegnen sollte, General Meade nicht bereit war, die anderen Corps tocross bis zum Dritten war bis zu ermöglichen. Ein zweites Hindernis wurde theresult der ein unverzeihlicher Fehler der engi - neers in Unterschätzung der Breite des Eapidan, damitder Ponton - Brücken sie konzipiert wurde über thatstream zu werfen, waren zu kurz, und Doubles - Arbeit und temporäre meansh

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Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac [electronic resource]: a critical history of operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, from the commencement to the close of the war 1861-5 . time named; for, not knowing what he should encounter on the other side, General Meade was unwilling to allow the other corps tocross until the Third was up. A second obstacle was theresult of an unpardonable blunder on the part of the engi-neers in underestimating the width of the Eapidan, so thatthe ponton-bridges it was designed to throw across thatstream were too short, and trestle-work and temporary meanshad to be provided to increase their length. In addition, another cause of delay resulted from the very precipitous A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES. 393 banks of the Rapidan, which rendered the passage of the ar-tillery and trains tedious and difficult. The effect of theseseveral circumstances was that the army, instead of makingthe passage of the river early in the day, was not acrossuntil the following morning. Twenty-four hours had passed, and only half the distance was made. Early on the morning of the 27th, the corps were again inmotion, and, under imperative orders from General Meade, . 8KETCH OF MINE ETIN. they pushed forward with greater rapidity. The Second Corps, under General Warren, reached its designated point at Robert-sons Tavern, about one oclock, and meeting a force of theenemy, immediately began to develop its strength and positionby a brisk skirmish fire. It will be remembered that, accord-ing to the plan, this corps was here to have been joined by theThird Corps, and it was not allowed to make a serious attack 391 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. until General French should arrive. But that officer hadfallen into a series of luckless mishaps, by which it happenedthat soon after crossing the llapidan at Jacobs Mill, he tookthe wrong road to reach Robertsons Tavern, fulling upon aroute too much to the right, which brought it against John-sons division of Swells corps

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• bookcentury1800
• bookdecade1880